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Abstract
In the standard two-sided matching models, agents on one side of the market (the institutions) can each be matched to a set of agents (the individuals) on the other side of the market, and the individuals only have preferences de…ned over institutions to which they can be matched. We explicitly study the consequences for stability when the composition of one's coworkers or colleagues can a¤ect the preferences over institutions. Journal of Economic Literature Classi…cation Number: J41.
Introduction
A large class of two-sided matching models describe situations in which agents on one side of the market, say …rms or colleges or more generally institutions, are each "matched" to agents, say workers or students or individuals, on the other side of the market. 1 A common assumption in these many-to-one matching models is that individuals have preferences de…ned only over the institutions to which they can be matched, although the special problems posed by couples was recognized. As Roth and Sotomayor [6, page 171] remarked, "we continue to make the simplifying assumption that workers are indi¤erent to which other workers are employed by the same …rm."
A moment's re ‡ection is enough to convince us that there are many instances where this "simplifying assumption"is unlikely to hold good. For instance, university professors care about the composition of the rest of the faculty, while soccer players would prefer to join a team of Peles and Maradonas. Clearly, the composition of one's coworkers or colleagues can a¤ect the preferences over institutions. The purpose of this paper is to incorporate workers'preferences over matchings which depend on the composition of colleagues into the traditional theory of twosided matching models. In particular, we analyse the consequences of imposing plausible restrictions on individuals'preferences over (institution-colleagues) pairs.
We essentially assume that workers'preferences are lexicographic. Within this broad category, one possibility is to assume that although workers care about who their coworkers are, it is their preferences over …rms which dictate their overall preferences over …rm-colleague pairs. We show that when workers preferences are of this type, then the set of matchings in the core 2 is nonempty. We then go on to examine whether the set of matchings in the core remains nonempty when workers'preferences over colleagues dictate their overall preferences. Within this class of "worker-lexicographic"preferences, we impose further restrictions. We …rst consider the case when a subset of the individuals are couples. We assume that each couple prefers a matching in which they are matched together with an institution rather than a matching in which they are paired with di¤erent institutions, irrespective of the "quality" of the institution. We 1 Crawford and Knoer [1] , Kelso and Crawford [3] , Roth [4, 5] are a small sample of this literature. See Roth and Sotomayor [6] for an illuminating and comprehensive survey of this literature as well as an exhaustive bibliography.
2 Throughout this paper, we assume that …rms' preferences over sets of workers satisfy a condition called substitutability. This condition is assumed even in the traditional model, where it turns out to be su¢ cient for a nonempty core.
show that despite the presence of couples, the set of stable matchings remains nonempty when preferences satisfy a condition similar to substitutability.
We then go on to assume that all workers share a common opinion about the relative desirability of all workers. In other words, there is a unanimous ranking of all workers, and any worker prefers to join a set of workers containing higher-ranked workers. An alternative assumption is that workers'preferences are separable. So, each worker divides his or her set of potential colleagues into the set of good and bad workers. Adding a good worker leads to a better set, while adding a bad worker leads to a worse set.
However, it turns out that in both the latter cases of worker-lexicographic preferences, one can construct preference pro…les which result in the core being empty. Hence, this paper shows that one of the major results of the standard model -namely, the existence of matchings which are immune to blocking by a coalition of …rms and agents -is not particularly robust.
Notation and De…nitions
The agents in our market consist of a set F of n …rms, and a set W of p workers. Generic elements of W will be denoted by w i ; m i ; w; i; j, etc., while those of F will be denoted by F i ; F j ; F , etc. In general, F represents the set of institutions (…rms, universities, research establishments), while W is the set of individuals (workers, university professors, researchers). We will typically use the terms …rms and workers to represent institutions and individuals.
Firms hire sets of workers, and each F j 2 F has a strict preference ordering
W is the set of all nonempty subsets of W. For any w i 2 W, let W i = fS j S W; w i 2 Sg. Each worker w i has a preference ordering R(w i ) de…ned over (F W i ) [fw i g with asymmetric component P (w i ). Note that this formulation allows a worker to care about the …rm that she is matched with, as well as with her coworkers.
A matching will be a particular assignment of workers to …rms keeping the bilateral nature of their relationship, as well as the possibility of any particular agent(s) being unable to …nd partners. The formal de…nition is given below.
De…nition 1:
A matching is a mapping from F [W into the set of all nonempty subsets of F [ W such that for all w 2 W and F 2 F:
Given any matching , and any worker w matched at , let F = (w) and S = (F ). Then, we will represent S as 2 (w). That is, 2 (w) is the set consisting of worker w and her colleagues in the …rm with which she is matched.
Let F 2 F. Then, the preference ordering P (F ) of …rm F over 2 W [ fF g induces an ordering over the set of matchings. Thus, …rm F prefers to if (F )P (F ) (F ). Similarly, the preference ordering P (w) of a worker w induces an ordering over the set of matchings. So, worker w prefers to if ( (w); 2 (w))P (w)( (w); 2 (w)). 3 With some abuse of notation, we will also let P (F ) and P (w) denote the induced orderings of F and w over the set of matchings.
De…nition 2:
A matching is individually rational if for all F 2 F and w 2 W, not fF gP (F ) (F ) and ( (w);
So, a matching is individually rational if no worker or …rm prefers to be unmatched. Notice that in a framework where workers have preferences over potential colleagues, this de…nition corresponds to the usual interpretation of individual rationality as a constraint which expresses what an individual agent can achieve unilaterally. In contrast, a matching in the traditional model is de…ned to be individually rational only if no …rm F prefers any subset of (F ) to (F ). Roth and Sotomayor [6] remark that "this recognises that F may …re some workers in (F ) if it chooses, without a¤ecting other members (italics ours) of (F )." Obviously, when workers have preferences over potential colleagues, if a subset of (F ) is …red, then some of the remaining workers may well quit. This makes our de…nition of individual rationality more appropriate in the present framework.
De…nition 3: Given any pro…le of preferences P=(fR(w)g w2W ,fP (F )g F 2F ), a matching is in the core, denoted C(P), if there is no A F [ W and a matching 0 such that:
Remark 1:
If such an A and 0 exist, then we will say that is blocked by A.
Also, note that if a matching is not individually rational, then it is obviously not in the core.
So, a matching is in the core if no group of …rms and workers can obtain a more preferred matching entirely on their own.
Remark 2:
An alternate version of the core, denoted by C W (P), is the set of matchings which cannot be "weakly blocked"by any group of …rms and workers, where is weakly blocked by A via 0 if all members of A …nd 0 at least as good as and at least one member of A strictly prefers 0 to .
Remark 3:
In the de…nition of the core given above, a matching may not be in the core because it is blocked by a group of …rms and some set of workers. However, it is easy to show that if a matching is not in the core, then either it is not individually rational or it is blocked by a single …rm and some workers.
Preference Restrictions
This section contains a description of various alternative restrictions that will be imposed on workers' preferences. However, we …rst de…ne a restriction of substitutability which will be imposed on …rms' preferences. It is known that when …rms'preferences are substitutable, the core is nonempty in the standard or traditional model when workers are indi¤erent about their coworkers. Since our purpose is to examine the consequences of permitting workers to care about their coworkers, we will assume that …rms'preferences are substitutable. Given any set S W, let Ch F (S) denote …rm F 0 s most-preferred subset of S according to its preference ordering P (F ). Since F is not a subset of S W, we are identifying the empty set with F itself in its preference ordering.
De…nition 4: P (F ) has the property of substitutability if for any set S containing workers w; w
So, if F has substitutable preferences, then it regards workers in Ch F (S) as substitutes rather than complements since it continues to want to employ worker w even if some of the other workers become unavailable.
Let P T denote the set of all logically possible preference pro…les where …rms' preferences are substitutable and workers' preferences correspond to the tradi-tional model. 4 We …rst consider markets in which a subset of individuals consists of couples.
where W c is the set of workers who are couples, and Q is the set of single workers. We will sometimes …nd it convenient to represent a typical couple (m; w) as c, and C as the set of couples.
We will assume that any member of a couple always prefers to be matched
(i) for all pairs (F; S); (F 0 ; S 0 ) 2 F W i , (F; S)P (i)(F 0 ; S 0 ) whenever S 2 W fcg and S 0 = 2 W fcg ; (ii) for all F 2 F and S; S 0 2 W fcg , i is indi¤erent between (F; S) and (F; S 0 ); (iii) for all F 2 F and S 2 W i such that j = 2 S, i is indi¤erent between (F; fig) and (F; S);
(iv) for all distinct F; F 0 2 F and S; S 0 2 W i , either (F; S)P (i)(
We will assume a stronger form of substitutability, which we call group substitutability guaranteeing that there are no complementarities among groups of workers. Denote by W the family of sets of the form S = fS 1 ; :::; S K g = S k2K S k , where for each k 2 K = f1; :::; Kg ; the set S k is either an element of W c , Q, or C. Obviously, every element of W can show up at most once in the set S. Consider …rm F with preferences P (F ) over all subsets of W , and consider any set S = fS 1 ; :::; S K g. Let Ch F (S) = T 2 S [ F j T P (F ) S k2M S k for all M K denote …rm F 's most-preferred subset of S according to its preference ordering P (F ).
De…nition 6: P (F ) has the property of group substitutability if for all S = fS 1 ; :::;
T denote the set of preference pro…les where preferences of individuals in W c satisfy togetherness, preferences of institutions satisfy group substitutability, while those of single individuals conform to those of P T . Note that we have modelled preferences of couples in a di¤erent way from that of Roth and Sotomayor [6] , who assume that a couple have a single preference ordering over pairs of …rms. This corresponds to situations where couples do not mind being matched to …rms which are geographically close to each other. Our formulation implicitly assumes that the option of being matched to …rms su¢ ciently close to each other is not present.
Apart from the markets with couples, we are going to assume that each worker w i 's preferences over F W i are lexicographic. Obviously, when workers'preferences are lexicographic, their preferences for either …rms or coworkers could dominate their overall preference ordering. Thus, we have two kinds of lexicographic preferences. These are de…ned below.
De…nition 7:
Worker w i 's preferences are F-lexicographic if there is a strict ordering P i over F such that for all (F; S); ( 
Thus, if w i 's preferences are F-lexicographic, then w i 's ranking of …rms, P i , determines w i 'preference ordering over all (…rm, coworkers) pairs in which …rms are distinct. W-lexicographic preferences have an analogous interpretation. We denote by P F the set of all logically possible preference pro…les where workers' preferences are F-lexicographic and …rms'preferences are substitutable.
We impose additional restrictions when workers' preferences are Wlexicographic. When preferences are W-lexicographic, it is su¢ cient to describe restrictions which operate on workers'rankings over sets of coworkers. Consider, for instance, the market for economists. Suppose all economists have a unanimous ranking of economists according to their desirability. Since there are obvious externalities generated by faculty members, most economists would prefer to join a faculty consisting of higher ranked economists. This provides the motivation for the next de…nition.
De…nition 9: Workers' preference orderings satisfy unanimous ranking according to desirability (URD) if 8 w i 2 W; 8 S; T 2 W i such that S = (T [ fw j g)nfw k g; w j = 2 T; and w k 2 T , we have that S P i T i¤ j < k.
Thus, all workers agree that w j is a "better" worker than w j+1 and their preferences over coworkers respond to this ranking.
Remark 4: Note that we are not going to assume that a …rm's preference ordering over sets of workers is consistent with this unanimous ranking of workers. Suppose, for instance, that a higher-ranked worker commands a higher salary than a lowerranked worker. If the salary di¤erential is large enough, then the net bene…t generated by the higher-ranked worker may well be lower.
Let P U RD be the set of all preference pro…les such that workers' preference orderings are W-lexicographic and which satisfy URD, while …rms' preferences are substitutable.
An alternative restriction will be one of separability. That is, each w i 2 W divides Wnfw i g into the set of good and bad workers. Moreover, adding a good worker leads to a better set, while adding a bad worker leads to a worse set.
De…nition 10: A worker w i 's preference ordering satis…es separability if there is a partition fG i ; B i g of Wnfw i g such that for all S 2 W i and w j = 2 S,
Remark 5: Note that workers do not necessarily agree on which workers are good and bad.
Let P S be the set of all pro…les such that workers'preferences satisfy separability, while …rms preferences are substitutable.
The Results
In this section, we explore the consequences of the various restrictions on preferences introduced in the previous section.
First, we show that the set of matchings in the core of the market with couples is nonempty when preferences pro…les are in P c T . 5 In order to prove this result, we need to modify the deferred-acceptance algorithm, which was originally de…ned by Gale and Shapley [2] .
We describe the version of the algorithm in which individuals make o¤ers to …rms. At any step of the algorithm, an individual (any worker) makes an o¤er to its most-preferred …rm 6 from amongst the set of …rms who have not already rejected the worker, while a …rm rejects all those workers who are not in the …rm's choice set from those proposals it has not yet rejected. The algorithm terminates when no …rm rejects a worker. Since …rms'preferences are substitutable, a …rm never regrets the decision to reject a worker at any step. Now, consider the following modi…cation of this algorithm.
Stage 1: For all c 2 C, let P (c) denote the restriction of P (w) on the set (F W fcg ) [ fwg. Consider market M 1 where each c 2 C is treated as a single individual with preference ordering P (c), so that the set of "individuals" is C [ Q. The set of …rms remains F. Note that in M 1 , preferences of all agents satisfy the assumptions of the traditional model, since conditions (ii) and (iv) in the de…nition of togetherness holds and …rms have group substitutable preferences. Now, use the deferred-acceptance algorithm with workers proposing, and let 1 be the resulting matching. Let C 1 be the set of couples who are matched to some …rm in F. If C 1 = C, then stop the algorithm. Otherwise, go to Stage 2. Stage 2: For all (m; w) = c 2 C nC 1 , let P (m) and P (w) denote the restriction of P (m) and P (w) on (F fmg) [ fmg and (F fwg) [ fwg respectively. Let M 2 denote the market where each c 2 C 1 is treated as a single individual with preference P (c), while P (m) and P (w) are the preferences of each pair (m; w) 2 C n C 1 . Each i 2 Q has the "original" preference ordering P (i). Again, now by conditions (iii) and (iv) in the de…nition of togetherness and group substitutability, M 2 satis…es all the assumptions of the traditional model. Let 2 denote the matching resulting from the deferred-acceptance algorithm with workers proposing. Let C 2 denote the set of couples in C 1 who are matched to …rms according to 2 . If C 1 = C 2 , then stop the algorithm. In general, stop the algorithm in any stage K such that C K = C K 1 , and call K the outcome produced by the algorithm. Let us call this the multi-stage deferred-acceptance algorithm.
Theorem 1: Let be the outcome of the multi-stage deferred-acceptance algorithm. If P 2 P c T then is in the core of any market with couples.
Proof: Suppose is not in the core of the (original) market with couples. Since it is trivial to check that is individually rational, let be blocked by some 6 Note that in the traditional model, individuals have a strict preference ordering over …rms.
pair (F; S) where S W. Let = K , so that the multi-stage deferred-acceptance algorithm terminates in stage K. Note that by construction
. Obviously, since each c 2 C K 1 is matched to some …rm in K , no member of c would prefer a match with F to K if her partner is not matched to F .
So, suppose (F; c)P (c)( K (c); c). Consider the deferred-acceptance algorithm in stage K. At some stage, c must have made an o¤er to F , but was rejected. But, since SP (F ) K (F ) and the …rm's preference are group substitutable, c cannot be contained in S.
For analogous reasons, S \ Q = ;.
Since couples in C n C K "split up" in stage K and since K must be in the core of market M K , the only remaining possibility is that S consists of some couples in C n C K ; that is, there are some fc 1 ; :::; c l g who are not matched as couples in K 1 (and hence K ), but such that F prefers these couples to K (F ).
Then, j made an o¤er to F in some step k in M K 1 and was accepted. Given group substitutability, if j made an o¤er to F in M K in step k, then j would be accepted by F . So, in M K , j is accepted by some …rm F 0 in an earlier step q. Moreover, F 0 rejected j in M K 1 . Again, this violates group substitutability of P (F 0 ).
Moreover, S consists of couples who were not matched in K 1 . Hence, (F; S) blocks K 1 , which contradicts the fact that K 1 is in the core of M K 1 .
In the next result, we will assume that workers' preferences are Flexicographic. We will see that in this case, the core is nonempty.
Let (P (w 1 ); :::; P (w p )) be any pro…le of F-lexicographic workers'preferences. Let P i be the ordering over F induced by P (w i ). Then, for all P 2 P F , let P t = (fP t (F )g F 2F ; fP t (w)g w2W ) be the pro…le such that P t (F ) = P (F ) for all F 2 F, and P t (w i ) = P i for all w i 2 W. For any P 2 P F , we label P t to be the induced traditional pro…le.
We remind the reader that C W (P t ) 6 = ;.
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Theorem 2: For all P 2 P F , C W (P t ) C(P).
Proof: Consider any P 2 P F , let P t be the induced traditional pro…le, and let 2 C W (P t ). Since 2 C W (P t ), is individually rational. Suppose = 2 C(P). Then, is blocked by some pair (F; S), where F 2 F and S 2 2 W . With some abuse of notation, we denote (w i ) = F i for all w i 2 W. So, S P (F ) (F ). Also, (F; S)P (w i )(F i ; (F i )) 8w i 2 S. The latter also implies that F i P i F for no w i 2 S. Hence, (F; S) weakly blocks according to P t . This contradicts the hypothesis that 2 C W (P t ).
We now analyse more "radical"departures from the traditional model.
Theorem 3:
There is P 2 P U RD such that C(P) = ;.
Proof: Let F= fF 1 ; F 2 g, and W= fw 1 ; w 2 ; w 3 ; w 4 g. We construct a preference pro…le P 2 P U RD such that C(P) = ;. Reminding the reader that workers' preferences are W-lexicographic, we only describe workers'preferences over coworkers.
Let fw 1 ; w 2 ; w 3 ; w 4 g be the unanimous ranking of workers according to desirability; i.e., w i is ranked higher than w i+1 . P is given by the following table, where again, elements are ranked in descending order of preference and only acceptable partners are listed. The reader can check that no worker can be unemployed in a matching if 2 C(P). Now, individual rationality implies that the only candidates for a matching in C(P) are: Hence, C(P) = ;.
In our next theorem, we show that the core can be empty even if workers' preferences are separable.
Theorem 4: There is P 2 P s such that C(P) = ;.
Proof: Let F = fF 1 ; F 2 g, and W = fw 1 ; w 2 ; w 3 ; w 4 ; w 5 g. Again, we construct a preference pro…le P 2 P S such that C(P) = ;.
First, the sets of workers judged to be good by each worker are shown below w 1 w 2 w 3 w 4 w 5 G i fw 2 ; w 3 ; w 5 g fw 1 ; w 3 ; w 4 ; w 5 g fw 1 ; w 2 ; w 4 ; w 5 g fw 2 ; w 3 ; w 5 g fw 1 ; w 2 ; w 3 g
The preference orderings, in descending order of preferences are:
w 1 w 2 w 3 w 5 fw 2 ; w 3 ; w 4 ; w 5 g fw 1 ; w 2 ; w 3 g fw 2 ; w 4 ; w 5 g fw 2 ; w 3 ; w 4 ; w 5 g fw 1 ; w 5 g fw 2 ; w 4 ; w 5 g fw 1 ; w 5 g fw 1 ; w 2 ; w 3 g fw 1 ; w 2 ; w 3 g fw 2 ; w 3 ; w 4 ; w 5 g fw 1 ; w 2 ; w 3 g fw 2 ; w 3 ; w 4 g fw 2 ; w 3 ; w 4 g fw 1 ; w 5 g Notice that we have not speci…ed preferences of …rms and workers completely. Any extension is permissible, subject to the preference orderings being consistent with the "good"sets speci…ed above and the pro…le being in P S .
Note that the matching h(F i ; fw 1 ; w 2 ; w 3 g);(F j ; fw 4 ; w 5 )i is blocked by fF i g [ fw 2 ; w 4 ; w 5 g. To check this, note that w 2 is "good"for both w 4 and w 5 . Moreover, fw 2 ; w 4 ; w 5 g P 2 fw 1 ; w 2 ; w 3 g, while fw 2 ; w 4 ; w 5 gP (F i )fw 1 ; w 2 ; w 3 g.
